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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v. California 1 made na2
tional headlines when it was announced in late June of 2014. Chief
3
Justice John Roberts’ opinion, for an all-but-unanimous Court, de4
clared that a search of the data available on a smart phone required
5
a warrant issued by a judge. According to the opinion, these devices
functioned as far more than phones. While capable of a making a
traditional telephone call, they also operated as cameras, electronic
calendars, video recorders, GPS devices, rolodexes, audio recorders,
and diaries; in every way, they performed as extremely capable pocket-sized computers, storing millions of pages of text, thousands of
photographs and video recordings, and thousands of web searches
6
going back years. In addition, they may contain data such as GPS
coordinates, requested directions, appointment calendars, and other
information that would allow the state to construct a highly detailed
depiction of the activities of the user for a considerable time in the
past, as well as a mosaic of the user’s personal interests, relationships,
7
medical conditions, and the like. The Court did not view the phone
as a mere physical object; rather, it said, the phone performs as a digital tool as multifunctional as a Swiss Army knife, and as a massive
storage unit, for all of the user’s present and past digital life. Given
the deep privacy concerns such technology raised, law enforcement
would henceforth need a warrant to burrow into this rich trove of
8
material. Chief Justice Roberts conceded that smart phones had, indeed, “become important tools” for “criminal enterprises,” and
searching the devices would no doubt provide incriminating evidence. The Court’s decision would therefore have a negative impact
9
“on the ability of law enforcement to combat crime.” But this did
not, and should not, change the outcome. “Privacy,” the Chief Jus10
tice said, “comes at a cost” —a sentiment that no doubt surprised
many observers of the Supreme Court’s cases involving police power
over the last several decades.
1
2

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (decided with United States v. Wurie, No. 13212 (decided June 25, 2014)).
Jess Bravin, Supreme Court: Police Need Warrants to Search Cellphone Data, WALL ST. J. (June
25, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/high-court-police-usually-need-warrants-for-cellphone-data-1403706571; Adam Liptak, Major Ruling Shields Privacy of Cellphones, N.Y.
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Deep in the opinion, exploring the considerable privacy interests
at stake in a police search of a smart phone, the Court admitted that
these concerns went further than just the data stored on the device.
[T]he data a user views on many modern cell phones may not in fact be
stored on the device itself . . . . [The device may be] used to access data
located elsewhere, at the tap of a screen. That is what cell phones, with
increasing frequency, are designed to do by taking advantage of “cloud
11
computing.”

Cloud computing, the Court explained, allows any device connected
to the Internet to “display data stored on remote servers rather than
12
on the device itself[,]” without knowing the difference. The scale of
the privacy interests in such a massive amount of data available remotely makes it inconceivable, the Court said, that any standard exception to the warrant requirement (such as the search incident to
arrest doctrine) could justify a search of all of the data accessible
through the device.
The Court’s discussion of how cloud computing makes the unlimited capacity of the digital world accessible from any smart phone
surely makes sense. But this exploration of cloud computing does
something more than just illustrate the vast scope of private data
searchable in the digital realm: it brings the Court face to face with
the shortcomings of the third-party search doctrine.
The third-party search doctrine arose in two cases from the 1970s:
13
14
United States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland. In both cases, the government sought access to the private information of a defendant: in
15
Miller, it took banking records by using a subpoena; in Smith, it obtained the numbers dialed from defendant’s telephone by using a de-

3
4

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

TIMES, June 25, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/us/supreme-courtcellphones-search-privacy.html?_r=0.
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495 (Alito, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
Chief Justice Roberts defined a smart phone as “a cell phone with a broad range of other
functions based on advanced computing capability, large storage capacity, and Internet
connectivity.” Id. at 2480.
Id. at 2495.
Id. at 2479, 2487–92.
Id. at 2487–92.
Id. at 2495.
Id. at 2493.
Id.
Id. at 2491.
Id.
425 U.S. 435 (1976).
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
Miller, 425 U.S. at 438.
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vice called a pen register. 16 In neither case did the government obtain a search warrant before getting the information. The Court used
Miller and Smith to say that no one could have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information willingly conveyed to a third party.
When a person conveyed information to a third party—a bank’s customer to a bank, in order to use a checking account, or a telephone
user to the telephone company, in the form of numbers dialed for
the purpose of making a connection to another phone—the person
“takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the infor17
mation will be conveyed by that person to the Government.” This
remains true “even if the information is revealed on the assumption
that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence
18
placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”
This line of reasoning made little sense when it appeared in the
1970s. To participate in the basics of modern life, like banking and
using a telephone, a person essentially forfeited any Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy in any information that the receiving institution might obtain as part of any transaction. One could not
maintain privacy rights in relation to the government except by giving up any interaction with any entity, public or private, that used or
processed one’s data. But in today’s world, the very idea of the thirdparty doctrine seems downright absurd. All aspects of participation
in the digital worlds of commerce, entertainment, and everything else
require—indeed, they depend upon—conveying data to an intermediary third-party organization. Yet the third-party doctrine still stands
and its implications become breathtaking in scope. Digital privacy
simply disappears.
But with Riley, perhaps a crack has appeared in this façade—one
that will inevitably widen, and at last get rid of the outdated and pernicious third-party doctrine. This is because the whole idea behind
the doctrine—that giving any information to anyone else means that
law enforcement can search or seize it—must yield to the Court’s
(correct) understanding of the use of data from the cloud, as articulated in Riley. If the use and availability of cloud-based data makes for
a vastly expanded privacy interest, and therefore adds to the justification of the need for a search warrant before searching the data exposed by a user’s smart phone, the third-party doctrine has outlived
whatever usefulness it once might have had. Cloud-based data is, by
16
17
18

Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
Id. at 744 (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 443).
Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
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its very nature, conveyed to and possessed by third parties. That is
both its function and its rasion d’être. If we now live in the world of
the cloud, and that world enjoys Fourth Amendment protection, as
Riley says, the Court must now recognize the third-party doctrine for
the relic it has become and cast it aside.
This is not to say that the Supreme Court seems ready to dump
the third-party doctrine. It has said nothing of the sort, and it actual19
ly cited Smith v. Maryland in the Riley opinion. But the seeds of the
argument appear in Riley, and they seem likely to sprout and grow.
I. RILEY V. CALIFORNIA: WHETHER TO RECOGNIZE AN EXCEPTION TO
THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT FOR SMART PHONE SEARCHES, AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE CLOUD
A. A Search Incident to a Valid Arrest: Balancing Government Need Against
the Intrusion on Individual Privacy
In Riley, the United States Supreme Court confronted a situation
that police encounter more and more often. In both cases, police
made arrests, and performed standard searches of the suspects incident to that arrest. Officers seized smart phones during these
20
searches, and then searched the data on the phones. These searches
produced incriminating evidence, which both defendants moved to
suppress; courts denied these motions, and both defendants suffered
21
convictions.
The government attempted to justify the searches of the data in
the smart phones under the “well accepted” exception to the warrant
22
requirement for searches incident to a lawful arrest. In Riley, the
Court explained that this exception rests on three related prece23
24
dents. In Chimel v. California, involving an arrest inside a home,
the Supreme Court decided that police may search the area of the
home that is within the arrestee’s immediate control, but no other
25
26
areas. In United States v. Robinson, the Court said that the risks of
any arrestee obtaining a weapon and the destruction of evidence inhere in all arrests, justifying searches incident to arrest that allow po19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492 (2014)(citing Smith, 442 U.S. 735).
Id. at 2477–79.
Id. at 2481.
Id. at 2482.
Id. at 2483.
395 U.S. 752 (1969).
Id. at 763, 768.
414 U.S. 218 (1973).
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lice to check the arrestee’s pockets and items within them even when
there is no specific threat to officers or concern about the loss of evi27
28
dence. And in Arizona v. Gant, the Court filled out the picture in
the context of vehicles: it permitted the search of a car when the arrestee remains unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment, or whenever an officer might reasonably be29
lieve that the vehicle might contain evidence of a crime.
The Court’s opinion in Riley rejected the idea that the police
could search the contents of a smart phone found in the pocket of an
arrestee, just as police who had searched a cigarette packet found in a
pocket could in Robinson. The Court balanced the extent to which
the police need to search in order to promote legitimate government
interests against “the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an
30
individual’s privacy.” The Court found that neither of the risks articulated in Chimel—the risk of access to a weapon or the risk of the
destruction of evidence—could justify the search of the data in the
31
phone without a warrant. The opinion found little reason to think
that either the phone itself, or the data within, could constitute a
weapon; the police could address any contingent danger—e.g., that
the data might indicate that the suspect’s confederates might approach—with case-specific exceptions, such as the exception for exi32
gent circumstances. Similarly, the Court dismissed any danger to
the evidence, such as the possibility of “remote wiping” of the data or
33
of data encryption. Law enforcement could meet these dangers,
34
should they exist, with technologies of its own or other measures.
On the other side of the balance, the capabilities of smart phones
made searches of the data on these devices uniquely intrusive, because searchers would have access to an unprecedented amount of
information. The government’s argument had ignored this technological reality, saying that the search of the data on a cell phone did
not differ materially from searches of physical items such as wallets or
purses, but the Court would have none of it. “That is like saying a
ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the
moon. . . . Modern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy con-

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Id. at 235, 236.
556 U.S. 332 (2009).
Id. at 353.
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2485.
Id. at 2485–86.
Id. at 2486.
Id. at 2486–88.
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cerns far beyond” the search of any objects found in an arrestee’s
35
pockets or on his or her person.
First, the word “phone” does not accurately describe these devices.
Rather, the Court said, think of them as “minicomputers” capable of
making telephone calls, but equally capable as “cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums,
televisions, maps, or newspapers,” making them qualitatively different
36
than other objects a person might carry. Second, this wide-ranging
capability comes with “immense storage capacity,” enabling the typical smart phone to store and carry an amount of information that
37
people simply could not, were the data in physical form. Third, as a
consequence of the portable storage of such an immense amount of
data in so many forms (pictures, messages, photos, and videos, etc.),
the data “reveal much more in combination than any isolated record,” enabling the reconstruction of “[t]he sum of an individual’s
private life,” both present and past (back to the dates on which the
38
first data was stored). Fourth, the use of smart phones has become
so pervasive that few Americans do not have these devices on their
39
persons at any given time. Fifth, smart phones collect and store
qualitatively different data than any file cabinet could: Internet
browsing histories, GPS location data timed to the minute, personal
messages to intimates, and the user’s substantive interests (the Court
mentions political affiliation, addictions, pregnancy or other health
40
issues, religion, and personal finance). In sum, a search of cell
phone data would expose virtually every aspect of a user’s life; indeed, it would “expose to the government far more than the most ex41
haustive search of a house.”
Comparing the government’s minimal-to-nonexistent interest in
searching for weapons or protecting evidence with the enormous intrusion on the arrestee’s privacy involved in a warrantless search of
the data on a cell phone, the Court declared that a search of a cell
42
phone’s data required a warrant. But the Court added one other

35
36
37
38

39
40
41
42

Id. at 2488.
Id. at 2489.
Id.
Id.; see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(arguing that such massive data collection about one’s location “may ‘alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to a democratic society’”).
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490.
Id. at 2490.
Id. at 2491 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 2493.
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factor into the mix: remote data storage and use, also called cloud
computing.
B. Cloud Computing
Without the user knowing it, smartphones use “data located else43
where.” This occurs not as an anomaly, but as standard operating
procedure; manufacturers equip smartphones to engage in cloud
computing. According to the Court, “[c]loud computing is the capacity of Internet-connected devices to display data stored on remote
servers rather than on the device itself. Cell phone users often may
not know whether particular information is stored on the device or in
44
the cloud, and it generally makes little difference.”
The Court noted that the government had conceded that the
search incident to a lawful arrest exception to the warrant require45
ment would not cover data stored in the cloud. Indeed, the government could not have said anything else without looking foolish; to
argue otherwise would be “like finding a key in a suspect’s pocket and
arguing that it allowed law enforcement to unlock and search a
46
house.” In fact, said the Justices, police officers searching the data
on the phone would not usually know whether or not what they
47
found came from inside the phone itself, or from the cloud.
The Court’s definition of cloud computing, along with its explanation of cloud computing’s importance in deciding whether to require a warrant, makes eminent sense. First, we can tell that the
Court correctly understands how accessing data remotely actually
works. This allows future courts to make correct decisions with as-yetunknown technology, because understanding what the Court in Riley
values requires an accurate factual picture. If the Court misses the
mark in its understanding of technological facts or chooses to ignore
what actually makes a new technology important, its rationale will
necessarily be unclear to judges looking back on the opinion. The
Court has not always succeeded in this respect in other recent opin48
ions. For example, in United States v. Jones, decided just two years
earlier, the Court had before it the question of whether placing a
GPS tracking device on the undercarriage of a vehicle for twenty-

43
44
45
46
47
48

Id. at 2491.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
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eight days, generating a complete locational record for a full month,
constituted a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion for the Court did not center on the fact that
tracking the vehicle’s location around the clock for twenty-eight days
intruded on individual privacy, enabling the police to build a detailed
picture of the driver’s movements. (This would have paralleled the
Court’s statement in Riley that using a large amount of data allows the
49
authorities to reconstruct “the sum of an individual’s private life.” )
Rather, Justice Scalia decided that the key element of the Fourth
Amendment intrusion was the placing of an object—the GPS device—on the vehicle, because this constituted a trespass on the de50
And in Maryland v. King, 51 in
fendant’s property (the vehicle).
which the Court upheld a state law that allowed police to take DNA
52
samples from arrested people without waiting for a conviction, Justice Samuel Alito’s majority opinion rested, in part, on the fact that
police needed DNA testing at the point of arrest in order to deter53
mine the arrestee’s identity. The majority came to this conclusion
despite the fact that determining identity from a DNA sample takes
weeks or months using current technology, and would therefore not
54
help police in trying to identify a suspect for the purposes of arrest.
Second, and more important for present purposes, the Court’s
opinion in Riley described cloud computing or remote data storage
accurately enough that we can understand how it works and therefore how it fits into our lives, and therefore how it fits into our expectations of privacy. The data, the Court said, does not reside in the
phone itself; it sits on another, much larger computer, somewhere
else, which does not belong to the user. And it is this quality that
emerges as a direct challenge to the third-party doctrine.

49
50

51
52
53
54

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952. While the decision looks like a failure to understand what GPS
tracking does and how it works, it may be that Justice Scalia simply preferred to ignore
this in favor of a rationale which he felt had greater appeal as a matter of doctrine.
133 S. Ct. 1958, 1965–71 (2013).
Id. at 1965–66.
Id. at 1971.
See, e.g., New York City Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, How to Submit a Case,
NYC.GOV (Jan. 16, 2016), www.nycgov.html/ocme/html/hss/how_to_submit_acase
_shtml (“A report describing the result of testing will be issued with 120 days of evidence
receipt . . . .”).
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II. THE THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME NEVER CAME,
AND WHOSE TIME IS CERTAINLY OVER
The third-party doctrine emerged in the 1970s in two cases that
created greater power for police investigators. These decisions
seemed to take everyday interactions and turn them into excuses for
government overreaching. But if that was true when the Court handed down these opinions, it is much more true now.
A. The Cases: Miller and Smith
55
The third-party issue first arose in United States v. Miller, in which
the government sought banking records belonging to the defendant:
checks, deposit slips, and the like. The government went after the
records, not through a search or seizure with a warrant, as in the
normal course of an investigation, but instead by issuing subpoenas
56
to two banks that the defendant used. The banks maintained these
57
records under the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, but they turned the
records over to the government anyway, and prosecutors then used
58
those records to convict the defendant. The defendant objected to
the use of the records against him, arguing that the government had
violated his reasonable expectations of privacy in those records by
59
seizing them without a warrant.
The Supreme Court sided with the government, saying that the
60
defendant had no privacy rights in his own banking records. Most
people might regard their own personal financial records as private,
especially with the Bank Secrecy Act in play. But that did not matter
to the Justices. Rather, the Court based its decision on the fact that
61
the defendant had conveyed his private information to his banks.
Any exposure of private information to a third party, the Court said,
defeated any possible claim that the defendant could claim any priva62
cy right in the information shared. “[W]e perceive no legitimate
‘expectation of privacy’” in the records or their contents, the Court
63
said.

55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

425 U.S. 435, 436 (1976).
Id. at 437–38.
Id. at 440–41.
Id. at 437–38.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 444–45.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 442–43.
Id. at 442.
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The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government. . . . [T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption
that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed
64
in the third party will not be betrayed.

In short, said the Court, “no Fourth Amendment interests of the
65
[defendant] are implicated here,” notwithstanding that the information came to the bank with the understanding that it would remain confidential. Such an understanding might seem like the very
essence of an “expectation of privacy,” yet the Court says, in effect,
that such an expectation could not be reasonable. By conveying his
information to a third party—his bank—the defendant “takes the
risk” that the bank will betray him to the government, simply because
the bank could betray him.
This notion seems curious indeed. Information in the hands of
one’s bank differs greatly from information one might tell a friend or
acquaintance, which the friend might repeat to others. Rather, it
constitutes private information about one’s finances—income
earned, debts paid, amounts owed, the far-too-small nest egg because
of poor savings habits. Most people would not share this kind of information widely, if at all. If one had told a very close friend about
these matters, one would likely feel deeply uncomfortable if this
friend had conversations with others—gossiping, if you will—about
such private matters. To call personal finances “private matters” may
seem to simply assume the correctness of the answer with which the
Court disagrees. Nevertheless, the reaction of most people to finding
out that a bank had shared personal financial information would be
simple: get a new bank. In this situation, expecting privacy could only be reasonable.
Consider a brief thought experiment. Imagine two customers in
the marketplace seeking banking services. One bank advertises in the
traditional ways, calling itself friendly, oriented toward customer service, and dedicated to paying the best rates possible and charging the
lowest fees. The second bank advertises the same features, in slightly
different words. But it also adds that customers should not expect
their financial information to remain confidential, especially vis-á-vis
a government request, because everyone knows that, in any relationship, one party may betray the confidence of the other. It seems in64
65

Id. at 443 (citations omitted).
Id. at 444.
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conceivable that anyone would choose the second bank over the first.
While it is understandable that individuals might disclose the secrets
of those who have confided in them, knowing that a bank would do
so seems like a deal-breaker.
We have seen this very phenomenon recently in a different industry. Major information and telecommunications companies in the
United States, such as Google, Verizon, Apple, and Facebook, faced
major questions from non-U.S. customers in 2013 and 2014 when disclosures by former National Security Agency (“NSA”) contractor Edward Snowden revealed that these firms had regularly cooperated
with NSA requests for data on their customers’ telecommunications
66
activity. If Americans did not mind that the NSA vacuumed up their
private information, and this activity broke no laws or social norms in
the United States, fine. But customers outside the United States did
67
not want this happening to their information, and these American
68
companies correctly saw this as a threat to their overseas business.
Apple was among the first to react, announcing that henceforth, using a password on its newest iPhones would automatically encrypt the
contents of the phone; the company would not have the key to the
69
code, and therefore could not decrypt anything for the government.
70
The Director of the FBI publicly attacked Apple for this move, and
others in law enforcement told the media that the iPhone would now
71
serve as the phone of choice for pedophiles and other criminals.
But the market had spoken, and Apple and other companies listened
to their customer and held their ground.
The Supreme Court revisited the third-party doctrine again just
72
three years later, in Smith v. Maryland. After a female victim was
robbed, she began to get distressing telephone calls from a man iden73
tifying himself as the robber. When police obtained information
66
67

68

69

70
71
72
73

Charlie Savage et al., U.S. Confirms That It Gathers Online Data Overseas, N.Y. TIMES (June 6,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/us/nsa-verizon-calls.html.
Anton Troianovski & Danny Yadron, German Government Ends Verizon Contract, WALL ST. J.
(June 26, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/german-government-ends-verizon- contract-1403802226.
Claire Cain Miller, Revelations of N.S.A. Spying Cost U.S. Tech Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
21,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/business/fallout-from-snowdenhurting-bottom-line-of-tech-companies.html.
Craig Timberg & Greg Miller, FBI blasts Apple, Google For Locking Police Out of Phones, WASH.
POST (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/2014
/09/ 25/68c 4e08e-4344-11e4-9a15-137aa0153527_story.html.
Id.
Id.
442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).
Id. at 737.
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that connected the defendant with the robbery and the calls, they
had the telephone company install a device called a “pen register” at
its central offices. The device would record the numbers dialed from
74
the defendant’s home phone number. The police did not obtain a
75
warrant or any other court order before installing the pen register.
The device revealed a call from the defendant’s number to the home
of the victim on one of the dates that the victim had received such a
call, and based on that fact and other evidence, the police obtained a
76
search warrant for the defendant’s home. The defendant moved to
suppress all of the evidence recovered in this search, because the po77
lice obtained it by using the pen register without a warrant. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and all of the evidence from
78
the search helped to convict the defendant.
The Supreme Court began with the basics: whether or not the
Fourth Amendment applies in any given situation, the Court said,
“depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a
‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’
79
that has been invaded by government action.” The defendant’s argument, the Court said, that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed from his home telephone was not correct.
Citing United States v. Miller, the Court said that even if the defendant
himself did expect the numbers he dialed would remain secret, such
an expectation was not reasonable because “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over
80
to third parties.” Like the bank depositor in Miller who chose to give
his private financial information to his bank, the defendant “voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and
‘exposed’ that information to [the telephone company’s] equip81
ment.” By doing this, the Court concluded that the defendant “assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers
he dialed,” equating the entirely electronic and mechanical switching
equipment the telephone company was using to the human operators
82
who used to connect phone calls for people in the past. And humans, of course, could spill secrets.
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 737–38.
Id. at 740.
Id. at 743–44.
Id. at 744.
Id.
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B. The Origin of the Idea that a Bank Customer or Telephone Dialer
“Assumes the Risk”
Reading the opinions in both Miller and Smith, one striking feature stands out: their reliance on the idea that a person who conveys
information to a third party “assumes the risk” that the third party
may disclose that information to another. The genesis of that idea
illuminates how poorly the third-party doctrine itself fits within our
constitutional framework.
The idea that one “assumes the risk” of a given activity or action
comes from torts: the part of Anglo-American law that governs civil
liability for noncriminal injuries incurred when one individual or organization harms another. Accurately used, the phrase “assumes the
risk”—usually, assumption of the risk—referred to a defense to a tort
83
claim. A defendant in a tort case could argue, under proper facts,
that a plaintiff’s claim should not succeed, because the plaintiff knew
of the dangerous condition at the heart of the case, and chose to ex84
By doing so, the plaintiff assumed the
pose himself to it anyway.
risk inherent in the activity, and cannot now complain that he or she
85
experienced injury because of the defendant. For example, imagine
A asks B if A can bring his square dancing club to the hayloft in B’s
barn for a hoe-down on Saturday night. B says: “Sure, but you better
think about it first—the floor is rotted through in a bunch of places.”
A goes up to the loft to have a look, sees the weak floorboards, and
while striding across the loft anyway, falls through the wood in the
floor, injuring his spine. A sues B for damages, but B will have a defense: A knew of the risk (he saw the loft floor had been weakened by
rot), but went ahead with his inspection of the loft anyway, thereby
knowingly and voluntarily assuming the risk of walking across the
floor and suffering an injury.
The assumption of the risk doctrine makes sense in torts; one
should not have to compensate another for damages when the other
person knowingly exposed himself to danger. But the doctrine does
not seem an intuitively obvious fit in the realm of constitutional criminal procedure. And its first appearance in modern criminal proce86
dure law illustrates this. In Lopez v. United States, a case decided by
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1963, the defendant made incriminating
83
84
85
86

See WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., TORT: CASES AND MATERIALS 590 (8th ed. 1988) (“In most
states the defense of assumption of risk [applies] to all negligence cases.”).
Id. at 590–91.
Id.
373 U.S. 427, 427 (1963).
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statements while attempting to bribe an Internal Revenue Service
87
(“IRS”) agent who was carrying a hidden recording device. The
agent had not obtained a warrant before recording the conversa88
tion. The Supreme Court’s majority opinion refused to recognize
any infringement of the Fourth Amendment rights of the defendant
89
by the government, saying the defendant simply took an unwise risk.
In dissent, Justice William Brennan argued that the Court had made
a mistake: the majority assumed that the Fourth Amendment only
protected information held in secrecy, and therefore the only way to
have Fourth Amendment protection for one’s private thoughts would
90
be to keep them private—from everyone, all the time. In the course
of that argument, Justice Brennan imported the assumption of the
risk doctrine into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
[The defendant] assumed the risk that his acquaintance would divulge
their conversation . . . . The risk inheres in all communications which are
not in the sight of the law privileged. It is not an undue risk to ask persons to assume, for it does no more than compel them to use discretion
in choosing their auditors, to make damaging disclosures only to persons
91
whose character and motives may be trusted.

Justice Brennan went on to say that the risk in cases like Lopez was not
a risk of casual gossip that one might expect in the course of human
relations. Rather, it was the risk that a third party, like a government
agent listening in on a private conversation, would later testify in
court about the private conversation. 92 This, Justice Brennan said,
could not be justified under the idea that our acquaintances sometimes betray us to others. It is, he said, a risk “of a different order.” 93
In two subsequent cases, a majority of the Court took Justice
Brennan’s “assumption of the risk” language from his dissent in
Lopez, and applied it to justify decisions that solidified the rule that
conversations with government informants enjoyed no Fourth
Amendment protection, even when the informant was a trusted
94
friend of the defendant. But the portion of the Brennan dissent
that filled out the full context—that while people must live with the

87
88
89
90
91

92
93
94

Id. at 430–31.
Id. at 430.
Id. at 439–40.
Id. at 449–50 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 450. While assumption of risk comes from torts, it is not clear that Justice Brennan
meant to impart a tort concept. Rather, he seems to be reacting to the majority’s use of
the concept of risk. See id. at 439.
Id. at 450.
Id.
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
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possibility of a confidant spilling their secrets, there should still be
Fourth Amendment protection against government intrusions—does
95
not appear. In the first of these two cases, Hoffa v. United States, the
federal government charged Teamsters Union leader Jimmy Hoffa
96
and three associates in 1964 with jury tampering. An earlier case
against Hoffa that took place in 1962, known as the Test Fleet trial,
ended in a hung jury; the 1964 case alleged that Hoffa and his associates bribed Test Fleet jurors. In the 1964 case, the government used
evidence obtained by one Edward Partin, who was a government informant, to obtain convictions of Hoffa and the others. Partin, a
friend and associate of Hoffa’s with his own substantial criminal his97
tory as well as pending state and federal criminal charges, gained
admittance to Hoffa’s hotel suite during the Test Fleet trial; he posed
as the same ally of Hoffa he had always been, when in fact he had be98
come an informant. After the government obtained convictions for
jury tampering, Hoffa argued that placing a government informant
within Hoffa’s private quarters and among his confidants, without a
warrant, violated Hoffa’s Fourth Amendment protection against un99
reasonable searches and seizures. The U.S. Supreme Court did not
agree, ruling that Hoffa had no Fourth Amendment protections
against the government’s use of informant Partin to gather information about him, even though Hoffa’s hotel room would have been
presumptively private. Hoffa “was not relying on the security of the
hotel room; he was relying upon his misplaced confidence that Partin
would not reveal his wrongdoing.” 100 In making this argument, the
Court majority turned to the dissenting opinion in Lopez by Justice
Brennan. “In the words of the dissenting opinion in Lopez,” said the
majority in Hoffa, “‘the risk of being overheard by an eavesdropper or
betrayed by an informer or deceived as to the identity of one with
whom one deals is probably inherent in the conditions of human society. It is the kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we
speak.’” 101 But the Hoffa majority omits Justice Brennan’s next sentence, emphasizing that intrusion by the government constituted a

95
96
97
98
99
100
101

385 U.S. 293.
Id. at 294–95.
Id. at 296–98.
Id. at 296, 302.
Id. at 300. Hoffa also argued that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights had been violated. Id. at 303–04.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 303 (citing Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).

Feb. 2016]

THIRD-PARTY SEARCH DOCTRINE

911

risk “of a different order” and does, in fact, create a constitutional violation.
The Supreme Court misused Justice Brennan’s dissent in Lopez
again the following year, when the Court decided Katz v. United
102
States, from which emerged the rule that searches or seizures violate
the Fourth Amendment if they intrude upon reasonable expectations
of privacy. 103 The question then became whether the Lopez/Hoffa “assumes the risk” idea survived the Katz decision. In United States v.
White, 104 in 1971, the Supreme Court said that it did. White, another
case involving a government informant, gave the Court the opportunity to restate the “assumes the risk” rule. “Inescapably,” the majority said,
[O]ne contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting to the police. If he sufficiently doubts their
trustworthiness, the association will very probably end or never materialize. But if he has no doubts, or allays them, or risks what doubt he has,
105
the risk is his.

From this brief survey of Lopez, Hoffa, and White, we learn something important about the purpose of this doctrinal transplantation
from torts to criminal procedure. The Court used the idea of assumed risk to protect the ability of police to use informants. The
Fourth Amendment had taken on new life in the context of every day
search and seizure cases. Since Mapp v. Ohio, 106 in 1961, the Court
had applied the exclusionary rule to the states. Henceforth, no court
would countenance purposefully ignoring the Fourth Amendment.107
After Katz and its reasonable expectation of privacy rules, one could
not help but ask whether placing an informant into a suspect’s home
or business to masquerade as a trusted friend violated those reasonable expectations. The continued use of informants, a tool used by
police and state authorities since time immemorial, seemed about to
collide head on with the Warren Court’s new criminal procedure. In
102
103

104
105
106
107

389 U.S. 347 (1967).
The “reasonable expectation of privacy” principle actually comes from Justice Harlan’s
concurring opinion. Id. at 361 (explaining “a twofold requirement” as “[f]irst that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”).
401 U.S. 745.
Id. at 752 (emphasis added).
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
For an apt description of what this change meant to a rank and file police office, see
Remo Franceschini, A MATTER OF HONOR: ONE COP’S LIFELONG PURSUIT OF JOHN GOTTI
AND THE MOB 36–37 (1993) (“All of a sudden . . . [y]ou had to have probable cause . . . .
The exclusionary rule essentially shut down police procedure that had been going on for
a hundred years.”).
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order to legally allow continued use of informants, the Court’s majority took Justice Brennan’s idea of assumed risk (which he did not intend to apply to government action) and turned it on its head (to
take away Fourth Amendment protection against government action). And it was the assumed risk idea that became part of the foundation for the third-party doctrine, just a few short years after White.
C. The Third-Party Doctrine: An Overreach the Day It Was Decided
When we see that the third-party doctrine rests on a tort idea
clumsily grafted into the law of criminal procedure, it becomes clear
that this constitutes a shaky rationale for deciding questions of privacy. But the way the third-party doctrine fit into the world at the time
of its creation in Miller and Smith made it something worse than a
weak rationale. Even in the 1970s, the third-party doctrine exposed
people to government searches that, by any measure, intruded deeply
into personal privacy.
The 1970s long pre-dated our era of Internet communications;
personal computers did not appear as a mass-produced, fully assem108
bled consumer items until the late 1970s and early 1980s. But even
in the 1970s, anyone who wanted to engage in commerce or in the
basic connections of social existence needed, at times, to pass information to trusted persons or institutions. Miller and Smith both make
excellent examples. Miller involved the use of checks: written orders
to an account holder’s own bank to pay to the order of a named per109
The account holder uses the
son a specified amount of money.
check—printed with the crucial information identifying the account
holder’s bank (the routing number, as well as the name of the bank),
the number of the (payor’s) account, from which funds will come,
and also—filled in by the account holder—the name of the person to
receive the money, and the amount of money. All of this information, contained on the check, serves as the set of instructions to a
trusted third party (the account holder’s bank) to enable a transaction to take place. With modern banks and the banking system, an
account holder could transfer large amounts of money and could do
so far more safely and faster than if account holder had to use cash.
This system enables the parties to more easily engage in greater
numbers of commercial exchanges, big and small. This, of course,
increases commerce and stimulates activity of all kinds, creating both
108
109

See Dan Knight, Personal Computer History: The First 25 Years, LOW END MAC (Apr. 26,
2014), http://lowendmac.com/2014/personal-computer-history-the-first-25-years/.
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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societal and personal benefits. Imagine, then, trying to exist in modern America without the advantages of banks taking and safeguarding
our deposits, paying them out as we command, whenever and to
whomever we demand. We can, of course, exist in a cash economy,
but its disadvantages are many: the exposure to loss and crime alone,
some of this crime potentially violent, makes a banking system
worthwhile. Yet under Miller, the price of modern banking includes
the loss of any Fourth Amendment-based protection for the privacy of
all information that one must disclose in order to engage in the most
110
basic transactions. Most people would probably find this surprising:
they would expect that the relationship with one’s bank, and information about personal finances in particular, would be held in confidence. But Miller makes this information available to the government
111
without the protection of a warrant issued by a judge.
Smith may be even more startling. The pen register—a device that
“records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling infor112
mation,” i.e., the numbers dialed by a caller—collected only this
limited information; it did not record the content of calls. Still, a
complete list of all of the numbers one has dialed could give someone with that information considerable insight into daily activities,
beliefs, and relationships. With particular numbers, one could make
reasonable guesses about a person’s health status (dialing one’s cardiologist or oncologist, for example), religious affiliation (calls to
one’s mosque or temple), romantic life (calling a paramour), sexual
orientation (calling a same sex partner), whether or not one gambles
(calls to a known bookmaker), or preference for intoxicating substances (calls to a known narcotics dealer). Thus the numbers dialed
can be invaluable in any effort to paint a picture of the dialer’s life,
and could even create leverage—i.e., blackmail material—over the
dialer.
Certainly, one could live in the world without using a telephone in
the 1970s; some people did (but usually because they could not afford one). But few would do this by choice if they could choose otherwise. By the 1970s, the telephone had become such a ubiquitous
feature of life in the United States, 103 years after the invention of

110
111
112

Id. at 442–43.
Id. at 443.
This definition comes from the federal law governing use of pen registers, particularly 18
U.S.C. § 3127(3). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 n.1 (1979)(defining the
term “pen register”).
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the device, 113 that no business could exist without one. Yet the price
of using a telephone was that the government was absolutely unrestrained in its ability to obtain information about whom a dialer had
called. As with banking, the use of something as basic as telephone
communication required the surrender of a certain amount of
Fourth Amendment rights, even forty years ago.
Thinking back to the 1970s, the price of the third-party doctrine
did not stop with Americans’ ability to keep private their bank records or phone numbers dialed. A quick thought back to that era easily produces a short list of disclosures that would also not be private
under the third-party doctrine:
· Transactions with utility companies to buy electric power, heating
fuel, water, and the like, since information on the quantity of each used
by the household must be conveyed to the utility;
· Health information, when conveyed to an insurance company, a billing department in a medical services company, or the like;
· Library books and other materials checked out under one’s card;
· Information on education, such as which courses one has taken,
grades received, or even school disciplinary records; or
· Credit information.

Of course, any of these types of information could receive protection under federal or state legislation. For example, educational information now enjoys protection from disclosure under the Family
114
Information given
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”).
to a health care professional (doctor or pharmacist, for example) is
protected from disclosure under the Health Insurance Portability and
115
But statutory protections do not
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).
give anyone the type of protection afforded by the Constitution. The
Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures remains beyond reach under the third-party
doctrine.
III. A DOCTRINE TOO BROAD IN THE 1970S HAS BECOME TODAY’S
PRIVACY NIGHTMARE
Let us leave the 1970s, and think about the place of the third-party
doctrine in today’s world. If sharing important information with

113

114
115

Ben Zigterman, How We Stopped Communicating Like Animals: 15 Ways Phones Have Evolved,
BGR (Dec. 13, 2013, 12:35 PM), http://bgr.com/2013/12/13/telephone-timeline-a-briefhistory-of-the-phone/.
20 U.S.C. § 1232g.
See generally 45 C.F.R. § 164.502.
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third parties such as banks and telephone companies had already become hard to avoid by the 1970s, in today’s world no real options exist. Across multiple dimensions of life, almost anything that does not
require physical contact now happens through the Internet. The
ubiquity of the online world, in every sector of our activities, means
that people can no longer avoid third-party contact involving the exchange of personal data. In short, for the great majority of people in
the United States today, much of life takes place online.
Take a brief inventory of the activities of an average American’s
daily life, and we see that the Internet plays a growing role in most of
them. While it is certainly possible not to use online capabilities for
some activities, or to use them only sometimes, others have all-butcompletely transitioned to the online world, leaving the physical
world as a less convenient, seldom used option.
BANKING—Start with banking and telecommunications, the subjects of Miller and Smith, respectively. In 1973, one could not perform
basic personal banking tasks—open an account, write or deposit a
check, or withdraw funds, for example—without giving the (third
party) bank information about the transaction in a way that, according to the opinion in Miller, removed from the transaction any Fourth
Amendment protection. This remains true now, only more so. For
decades, banks have moved customers toward the use of electronically-connected intermediaries we call automatic teller machines
116
ATMs can
(“ATMs”) and away from interaction with bank tellers.
now do almost anything a human teller can: withdraw cash, check
117
account balances, accept deposits and payments, and the like. For
many bank customers, debit cards have supplanted cash and checks
as the mode of point-of-sale payment; together, debit and credit card
118
Bill
transactions have overtaken total cash and check payments.
payment may also run through banks and online services; millions of
Americans list their regular payment recipients on the online sites

116

117

118

See Lauren Abdel-Razzaq, Banks Redefine Role of Teller in Move Toward Technology, DETROIT
NEWS (Feb. 27, 2015, 11:12 PM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/ business/ 2015/
02/27/ technology-changing-bank- teller-role/24156071/ (explaining that moves toward
automated technology is “making it much less likely that a customer will interact with a
human”).
Constance Gustke, Speedy, New ATMs Get High-tech Makeover, BANKRATE.COM (Feb. 24,
2014),
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/banking/new-breed-of-atms-get-high-techmakeover.aspx.
Jeremy M. Simon, Paper to Plastic: Checks and Cash Losing To Debit and Credit,
CREDITCARDS.COM (Oct. 3, 2007), http://www. creditcards.com/credit -card-news/
debit-credit- card-preferred -payment-1271.php.
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and use the sites to make their monthly payments. 119 And of course,
all of the information transmitted to third-party banks by individual
customers and businesses comes through another third party: Inter120
In short, almost any aspect of pernet service providers (“ISPs”).
sonal or commercial financial activity will involve giving personal data
to a third party—sometimes more than one third party. When dealing with anything except cash, one simply cannot escape the rationale
of Miller.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS—Like banking, the telecommunications
industry—what we would have called the telephone companies in
121
1979 —has become an even more significant recipient of third-party
data than it was at the time of Smith. In fact, in many practical ways,
the telecommunications industry is the third party. Telecommunication companies—including not just the descendants of the legacy telephony carriers, but also cable companies (formerly cable television
companies) and companies that focus on Internet communications—
are the intermediaries for virtually all of the commercial and personal communications of daily life. These companies serve as the thirdparties for companies that, by themselves, would not necessarily have
third party status. For example, imagine a small business of almost
any kind: a specialty cigar store, or a gourmet food business, perhaps. Both of these businesses would likely have brick and mortar locations, at which a customer could come in, browse and locate goods,
and pay in cash. But today, many such businesses have online
presences as well. The cigar shop or the gourmet outlet can create a
website, using online tools and hosted by an Internet service provider. The site will advertise the stores’ products, and sell their goods
through the third-party web host, and will utilize third-party payment
options (debit or credit card companies, non-cash, non-credit payment options like PayPal, or the like). The customer will receive the
physical product through shipping by yet another third party: United
Parcel Service, Federal Express, or the U.S. Postal Service, just to
name a few options, all of whom share connections to the merchant
through the Internet. In each phase of these transactions, information is flowing from the consumer to one or more businesses,
through third-party telecommunications intermediaries. In turn, the
119

120
121

See Jane Bryant Quinn, Should I Pay Bills Online?, MONEYWATCH (Feb. 5, 2010, 11:38 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/online-bill-pay/ (explaining that millions of users enjoy
the efficiency and security benefits of paying bills online).
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (“[T]he pen register was installed on telephone company property at the telephone company’s central offices . . . .”).
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sellers of the goods use other businesses, such as shipping companies,
to complete the transactions, and this generates yet more data flowing through third-party telecommunications operations.
RETAIL SALES—Amazon started in the 1990s as a company that
sold books online, using credit cards or other electronic payment systems. Amazon now sells almost any consumer product imaginable,
delivered to the homes of its customers; streaming video entertain122
Amazon’s Internetment; and even server capacity for businesses.
based model has proven so successful that virtually all retail businesses have had to reassess their business models. Even Wal-Mart, the
largest American retailer, has had to fight Amazon by enlarging its
123
More to the point, all of this
own Internet presence significantly.
commerce, and the company’s astounding growth, has its basis in
third-party transactions: individual customers transmit information
to third-party retailers like Amazon, including orders and payment
information, and none of this has any Fourth Amendment protection
under Miller and Smith.
MEDICAL INFORMATION—For some years, both the government
and large health care companies have moved toward electronic med124
ical records systems. Along with these changes, individual consumers of health care may now manage the day-to-day aspects of
healthcare through Internet portals. For example, one typical medical insurance provider encourages all enrollees to use its electronic
system for making and changing appointments, obtaining prescription refills, receiving the results of diagnostic tests, and basic com125
munications with their doctors. Patients can access all of their medical records through the system. The system also encourages
enrollees to use the system for medical consultation, for 24/7 online

122

123

124

125

See BRAD STONER, THE EVERYTHING STORE: JEFF BEZOS AND THE AGE OF AMAZON (Prologue) (2013). This last item does not, strictly speaking, constitute retail sales. At this
writing, Amazon makes growing shares of its revenues and operating income. Neil McAllister, Amazon Lifts Lid on AWS Money Factory, Says It’s A $5 BEEEELLION Biz, THE REGISTER
(Apr. 23, 2015),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/04/23/amazon_q1_2015_earnings_cloud/.
Clare O’Connor, Wal-Mart vs. Amazon: World’s Biggest E-Commerce Battle Could Boil Down to
Vegetables, FORBES (Apr. 23, 2013, 4:53 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor
/2013/04/23/wal-mart-vs-amazon-worlds-biggest-e-commerce-battle-could-boil-down-tovegetables/print.
See Suzanne Allard Levingston, Electronic Health Records’ ‘Make-or-Break Year’, BUSINESSWEEK
(Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-11-14/2014-outlookelectronic-health-records-make-or-break-year (describing the Obama administration’s efforts to introduce a digitally connected health care system).
MYUPMC, https://myupmc.upmc.com (last visited July 22, 2015).
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medical visits. 126 These systems have many advantages for patients
and medical professionals, and they may represent a great improvement in service delivery and cost control. But they also fit perfectly
within the Miller/Smith paradigm: no Fourth Amendment protection
when information goes to a third party, such as the web-based health
portal. Of course, Congress has created statutory privacy protections,
127
through HIPAA. But this protection lasts only as long as Congress
wants it; Congress can repeal the law tomorrow.
Keep in mind that “medical information” will not only include information about how many appointments a person may have and
whether and how the patient pays bills. Information passed through
these systems, to physicians, nurses, and other medical service providers—especially through a system that asks patients to submit their
symptoms by email and to receive an answer about them same way,
and to request prescription medicine refills—will mean that the information about those symptoms and the information about what to
do about them will enjoy no Fourth Amendment protection. It is an
easy thing to draw inferences from this information: a requested refill for Prozac? The patient probably has some depression or maybe
another mental illness. It helps the doctor and the patient when the
patient can communicate symptoms and other information to the
doctor, quickly and efficiently. But one could imagine a different reaction—a far less positive one—to the idea that this information has
no constitutional protection from a government snooping without a
warrant.
SOCIAL LIFE AND RELATIONSHIPS—The examples of the ways that
social life requires submission of information to and through third
parties keeps growing. Facebook comes to mind first; with its 1.49 bil128
lion active users, it remains the 800-pound gorilla of social media.
A host of others also fill this space: Twitter, LinkedIn, Pinterest, and
any number of smaller entities. Aside from these are sites for dating
and romance, such as eHarmony.com, Match.com, Chemistry.com,
129
OKCupid.com, Zoosk.com, PlentyofFish.com, and even religiously

126
127
128

129

Id.
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
Number of Monthly Active Facebook Users Worldwide as of 1st Quarter 2015 (In Millions),
STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebookusers-worldwide/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
See, e.g., Kristen Buck, Online Dating Review, Reviews and Comparisons, TOP TEN REVIEWS,
http://online-dating-review.toptenreviews.com/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2016) (reviewing the
qualities of the best online dating sites such as Match.com).
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oriented sites such as ChristianMingle.com and JDate.com. 130 Even
those interested in adultery have had a site to visit:
AshleyMadison.com. 131 All of these sites oriented to one or another
kind of social connection operate with either user-generated content
(Facebook), or by using data supplied by the user to the third party
to generate a particular result (e.g., the large-database dating sites,
such as Match.com, eHarmony.com, and OKCupid.com, use data
submitted by users in answers to online surveys to help create matches for patrons). In every way, social media and sites designed to serve
a particular social function surely qualify as third parties under Miller/Smith.
ENTERTAINMENT—Many entertainment experiences do not require the transmission of personal data and information to third parties. One can still pay cash at the box office for a ticket for a movie or
play or concert, an art exhibit or a sporting event, and enjoy the performance or game (assuming, that is, no need for advance purchases
or reservations, which could require submission of information,
probably including credit card numbers, perhaps via the Internet).
But the largest and fastest growing type of entertainment is often
quite different. The video gaming industry is now larger than the
movie business, with $70.4 billion in worldwide revenue in 2013,
compared to $35.9 billion in worldwide box office revenue for mov132
ies. And while much of that gaming activity may take place in one’s
home on one’s own equipment, a fast-growing portion of the business
consists of multiplayer games: games in which one joins other players
133
online, to play against others or in groups. For these online activities, one needs not only a connection to the Internet (the ISP is, itself, a third party), but also a set of transactions—registration, payment, etc.—with the provider of the game. For this, one must—of
course—submit information to the game provider.
130

131

132

133

See Christian Reviews, RELIGIOUS DATING, http://www.datingsitesreviews.com/staticpages
/index.php?page=12 (last visited Nov. 12, 2015) (providing user reviews on religiously
oriented dating websites).
See Charles Riley, Hackers Threaten to Release Names from Adultery Website, CNN MONEY (July
20, 2015, 6:16 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/20/technology/Ashley-madisonhack/ (explaining that the popular online dating website for individuals seeking extramarital relationships was hacked).
David Mullich, Who Makes More Money: Hollywood or the Video Game Industry?, QUORA
(Dec. 14, 2014), http://www.quora.com/Who-makes-more-money-Hollywood-or-thevideo-game- industry.
See Anya Kamenetz, Why Video Games Succeed Where the Movie and Music Industries Fail, FAST
COMPANY (Nov. 7, 2013, 2:36 PM), http://www.fastcompany.com/3021008/why-videogames-succeed-where-the-movie-and-music-industries-fail (arguing that video games operate as services rather than products).
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LEARNING—Parents have always had to give schools some information in order to enroll their children and to keep them eligible to
attend. Typically, parents submit information concerning the student’s resident status in the district, the student’s vaccination and
other medical records, who to call in case of an emergency, and even
information on medical issues that could arise on any given day, such
as allergies, the need for an inhaler, or the like. But today, at every
level of the educational process, data on students in the hands of
schools abounds. When using software-based learning products, students may be recording their competencies, or evidence of learning
134
disabilities. They may use school computers (e.g., iPads or laptops)
that take in all manner of personal information. In higher education, the growing presence of online learning—whether in the form
of courses for students at one particular university, or in the form of
135
Massive Open Online Courses (“MOOCs”), which can include
thousands of students all over the world—means that students will, as
a matter of course, transmit their data to third-parties regularly. These data may identify students, such as information for purposes of
registration or payment, or may be the coursework or questions in
the course. Whatever it is, the third-party doctrine leaves these data
without constitutional protection against government intrusion.
Nevertheless, the third-party doctrine has defenders. Notably,
136
Professor Orin Kerr has defended the doctrine in two articles, because it does no more than ensure a kind of technological neutrality,
giving the government the same power under the Fourth Amendment vis-à-vis communications networks as it has in the physical
137
Under his analysis, the Smith decision is a way to allow the
world.
police the same power over a communications network that the po138
He points out that what
lice could wield in the physical world.
happens in the home has Fourth Amendment protection, but that
protection does not cover what happens in public. He analogizes the

134

135
136

137

138

Natasha Singer, Uncovering Security Flaws in Digital Education Products for Schoolchildren, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/09/technology/uncoveringsecurity-flaws-in-digital-education-products-for-schoolchildren.html?_r=0.
Rachel Fishman, Arizona State to Offer MOOCs for Credit. What Will It Mean for Students?,
NEW AMERICA ED CENTRAL (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.edcentral.org/global-freshman.
See generally Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach,
62 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (2010); Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, 107 MICH.
L. REV. 561 (2009).
See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS
517 (13th ed. 2012) (considering the role of the third-party doctrine in monitoring
communications over networks in comparison to communications within physical space).
Kerr, The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, supra note 136, at 578.
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contents of communications—in Smith, what people say during a
phone conversation—to things happening inside a home; metadata—in Smith, the numbers dialed—is like what happens in public.
Under the Fourth Amendment, the police could surveil actions in
public without raising any Fourth Amendment concerns, but they
would need a warrant to gather data in any way about what happens
inside a home. The same should be true in a communications network: contents (the conversation itself, on the phone; the message
itself, in an email message) enjoy Fourth Amendment protection, but
the metadata—equivalent to physical information about who the caller interacts with publically—does not. When the defendant in Smith
harassed his victim using the telephone system, he could hide himself
in a way that he could not if the harassment took place in public,
139
Using a technological device (the
where police could observe it.
pen register) to see who the defendant had called from his phone
number does no more than a police officer could do by observing the
defendant walking to his victim’s house to harass her in the physical
140
world.
Professor Kerr’s argument is certainly logical. But it fails to deal
with at least two important things. First, Smith may be the Supreme
Court case most people think of today when they discuss the thirdparty doctrine, but it was not the only, or even the first, case from the
141
Court to set down the doctrine’s parameters. United States. v. Miller
preceded Smith by three years, and the material in that case that received no Fourth Amendment protection went beyond so-called
metadata (which phone numbers called what others). Recall that
Miller created the third-party doctrine in the context of banking, with
the government seizing the records themselves, including their contents—not just who had these records or who received them. The
government captured the defendant’s bank records: “all records of
accounts, i.e., savings, checking, loan or otherwise, in the name of
142
Mitch Miller.” These items included checks, deposit slips, financial
143
statements, and monthly statements. In the ruling in Miller that laid
the groundwork for Smith, the Supreme Court said that “we perceive
no legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’ in their contents . . . . All of the
documents obtained . . . contain only information voluntarily conveyed
to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course
139
140
141
142
143

Id. at 578.
Id. at 577–78.
See generally United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
Id. at 437.
Id. at 438 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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of business.” 144 In other words, the Court did not differentiate between message content and message metadata in Miller; rather, content had no more Fourth Amendment protection than any “to” or
“from” information on the documents because the defendant had
given that content to others, voluntarily. Thus assuming Professor
Kerr’s analogy explains Smith, it cannot explain Miller.
But there is a larger, more important point that tells us that, even
if we accept Professor Kerr’s justification of Smith, the doctrine remains outdated. There is, quite simply, an immense difference between collecting the numbers called by one person from his or her
telephone, and collecting all of the numbers he or she has called for
the past year or five years, along with identifying information on all of
the web sites the person has visited, every physical location visited,
and all of the photographs and videos the person has taken. To
quote Chief Justice Roberts’ in Riley, it is “like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon.” 145 The
digital world, and the ways in which we can collect, store, analyze, and
map the ever-growing pile of data produced on each of us every day is
qualitatively different from what we can observe in the physical world.
As Justice Sonia Sotomayor said in her concurrence in United States v.
Jones, the GPS case, the doctrine simply does not fit the digital age. 146
The assembled digital mosaic of our individual lives, contained in any
smart phone, must receive Fourth Amendment protection, unless we
would grant our government unlimited access to a detailed record of
virtually everything we do in our lives, just for the asking. As Justice
Sotomayor implies, this just cannot be right, and it is ludicrous to
think that Americans would simply accept it without question. 147
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S DISCUSSION OF THE THIRD-PARTY
DOCTRINE IN RILEY
In the Riley opinion, the Court discussed the third-party doctrine
148
once, and only briefly. The Justices spent far more time discussing
issues that spring from the concerns above: so much of the information we depend upon today finds its way onto the phones that an
incredibly high percentage of Americans carry with them almost all

144
145
146
147
148

Id. at 442 (emphasis added).
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488 (2014).
132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2486.
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the time. 149 These two parts of the discussion might look unrelated,
but in the end they have much to do with each other.
The Court’s direct discussion of the third-party doctrine came toward the end of the opinion, in the context of an argument by the
government that officers seizing a phone should always have the authority to search the phone’s call log without having to obtain a warrant. The authority cited by the government for this proposition was
Smith v. Maryland, of course, which allowed police to use a pen register to obtain the numbers dialed from a particular phone without
150
The Court dismissed the government’s arfirst getting a warrant.
gument out of hand, because in Smith the Court had “concluded that
the use of a pen register was not a ‘search’ at all under the Fourth
151
Amendment.” By contrast, there was no question that in Riley that
152
“the officers engaged in a search of [Defendant’s] cell phone.”
This statement seems curious indeed. If Smith is still good law (and
the Court does not repudiate Smith in Riley), then a search of a
phone’s data that revealed only the numbers dialed on the phone’s
153
call log cannot amount to a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, either. The Court seems to want to have things both ways: searching data on a smart phone, even just the numbers dialed as listed in
the call log, is a Fourth Amendment search according to Riley; but
under Smith, the third-party doctrine says that obtaining the numbers
dialed using another technology is not a Fourth Amendment search.
This reveals a conflicted rationale: on the one hand, wanting the data on smart phones protected, because of the massive intrusion on
privacy that warrantless searches of smart phone searches would constitute, and on the other hand not wanting to overrule Smith and the
third-party doctrine, which has always favored and served law enforcement.
When the Court gets to the larger question of the privacy costs of
allowing warrantless searches of data on cell phones, however, it takes
a very broad view. Smart phones today are “minicomputers” with
154
“immense storage capacity” that might contain “millions of pages of
text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos,” not to mention
149
150
151
152
153

154

Id. at 2484.
See id. at 2492 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979), for the proposition
that use of a pen register to record dialed phone numbers was permissible).
Id.
Id. at 2492–93 (citation omitted).
The Court does say that information, in addition to the numbers dialed, is also available
on the call logs of most phones. Id. at 2493. But this does not answer the question of
whether or not the log might be viewed only to reveal the numbers dialed.
Id. at 2489.
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“text messages, Internet browsing history, a calendar,” and other
155
treasure troves of personal data. Putting all of this information together gives the government a unique and nuanced picture of an individual’s life, because the data “reveal much more in combination
156
The browsing data, along with location
than any isolated record.”
data, the Court said, seem “qualitatively different” in terms of their
capacity to reveal “private interests or concerns,” such as health, and
physical whereabouts reconstructed along a precise timeline can
trace out a person’s “familial, political, professional, religious, and
157
sexual associations.” These phones have become so ubiquitous, the
Court said, that three-quarters of Americans report having their devices within five feet of them most of the time, and 90% of these
phones contain, “a digital record of nearly every aspect of [their own158
er’s] lives,” even surpassing the quantity of records one would typi159
cally find in someone’s entire home.
This vast trove of data, much of it highly personal and extremely
revealing, simply had to have the protection of the Fourth Amendment against warrantless searches, the Court said. The new technology of the Internet, and the devices available to us, mean that our old
assumptions about searching the objects found in the pockets of
clothing simply do not hold when the object in question is a smart
phone. And this new reality, the Court said, does not depend on
whether the data on the cell phone come directly from inside the
phone itself, or from a remote storage area —the cloud, in today’s
common parlance. It is the nature and quantity of the data accessed
from the phone that matters, not where the data resides.
At least in the context of smart phones and other digital devices,
the application of the Court’s privacy discussion to all data accessible
from the device amounts to nothing less than an implicit repudiation
of the third-party doctrine. Data located in the cloud can only be
seen as having been conveyed to a third party: the owner of the servers on which the data sits. Thus, without saying so, the Court’s opinion in Riley crosses a long-standing barrier. Information passed to a
third party, and accessed remotely from the computers of that third
party, which would clearly fall on the unprotected side of the Miller/Smith third-party rule, does have protection under the Fourth Amend155
156
157
158
159

Id.
Id. at 2479.
Id. at 2490 (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012)(Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
Id. at 2479.
Id. at 2491.
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ment. And if that is so, the third-party doctrine has effectively been
breached, and this may be the beginning of its end. True, the Court
inserts a sentence to prop up the doctrine. But the very mildness of
that support—just saying that, under Smith, collecting dialed phone
numbers did not constitute a search and required no warrant – may
constitute the first faint signal that the Court knows it cannot have
things both ways. If the third-party doctrine is correct, data contained on remote servers, accessed by the smart phone user, has no
expectation of privacy and no Fourth Amendment protection. If the
data on remote servers carries an expectation of privacy for Fourth
Amendment purposes, the third-party doctrine can no longer stand
as it has since the 1970s. And of these two possibilities, the Supreme
Court seems to have chosen the latter. This way of thinking has
much less in common with the Miller/Smith third-party doctrine’s
view of privacy than with Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in
Jones v. United States., in which she described the third-party doctrine
as
ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out
mundane tasks . . . I would not assume that all information voluntarily
disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that
160
reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.

At bottom, this seeming contradiction comes not as a result of a
sudden shift of opinion on the Court with regard to privacy. Rather,
it comes from a material change in widely available technology. This
change is significant enough that it has forced the Court to re-think
its assumptions about privacy, and other changes must follow. Fortunately, we have an example to guide us, from the not-too-distant past,
that will allow us to see what the way forward might look like.
V. FROM OLMSTEAD TO KATZ: HOW ADVANCES IN WIRETAPPING
FORCED A CHANGE IN THE LAW
A. The History of Another Technological Innovation
To know whether the U.S. Supreme Court might change its view
of the third-party doctrine, even abandoning it, despite the fact that
the Court did not do so in Riley, we can look back to the early twentieth century. By the 1920s, technology available to law enforcement
had changed: with the ubiquity of the telephone and telephone service, wiretapping had become part of law enforcement’s arsenal. To160

132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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wards the end of that decade, the Supreme Court had to face the
question whether using wiretaps without prior judicial approval in the
form of a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.
161
Today, the case of Olmstead v. United States is chiefly remembered
162
for the dissent of Justice Louis Brandeis, as he looks ahead to the
country’s future if the police are allowed to use wiretapping without
restriction by courts. Justice Brandeis believed that warrantless wiretapping violated the Fourth Amendment, and that the prosecution’s
use of any evidence gathered through a warrantless wiretap violated
that constitutional provision. In the simplest terms, wiretapping con163
Almost ninety years later, judges, scholars,
stituted lawbreaking.
and students still quote his dissent.
Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or
for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. . . . If the Government
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that, in the
administration of the criminal law, the end justifies the means—to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the
164
conviction of a private criminal—would bring terrible retribution.

Much less remembered, however, is that the majority opinion in
Olmstead declared that use of a wiretap to gather the contents of a telephone conversation, when the wiretap did not take place inside the
home, did not constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes
and required no warrant. According to Chief Justice William Howard
Taft, no violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred “unless there
has been an official search and seizure of his person, or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical
invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making a seizure.” 165 The requirement of “an actual physical invasion” made all
the difference in the case, because the Fourth Amendment analysis at
that time turned on whether the defendant had suffered a trespass by
the government in the gathering of the evidence. The invention of
the telephone, the majority said, had upended many of our expectations and customs.
By the invention of the telephone, fifty years ago, and its application for
the purpose of extending communications, one can talk with another at
a far distant place. The language of the Amendment can not be extended and expanded to include telephone wires reaching to the whole world
161
162
163
164
165

277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Id. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 466 (emphasis added).
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from the defendant’s house or office. The intervening wires are not part
of his house or office any more than are the highways along which they
166
are stretched.

What the Fourth Amendment protected, Chief Justice Taft implied,
was not the conversation itself, but the physical aspect of the home.
The defendant had a “telephone instrument” installed in the house,
167
and then wires carried conversations beyond the house; the government intercepted the conversations outside the house, never entering the dwelling – and therefore committing no trespass. Therefore, the warrantless wiretap had not violated the Fourth
Amendment. Congress, the Chief Justice said, could create legislation that would make it illegal to use wiretaps outside the confines of
the home, but the Court could not do this by interpreting the Fourth
168
Amendment more broadly.
Nearly forty years later, the Court changed course, prompted in
169
no small part by new technology. In Katz v. United States, the government charged the defendant with federal offense of transmitting
“wagering information” over interstate telephone lines. To prove the
case, the government introduced not recordings or transcripts of
conversations about gambling captured through traditional wiretaps,
but something else: “evidence of the [defendant’s] end of telephone
conversations, overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public tel170
The
ephone booth from which [defendant] had placed his calls.”
agents had obtained the defendant’s part of the conversations in the
telephone booth by using a contact microphone: a microphone capable of successfully picking up a conversation from inside a telephone booth or an adjacent room, when attached to the other side of
171
the wall. One of these contact microphones was attached to the top
of the telephone booths defendant Katz used to discuss gambling and
bookmaking. According to the Court of Appeals, which heard the
case before it went before the Supreme Court, the agents placed the
microphones “on the tops of two of the public telephone booths
normally used by the [defendant] . . . with tape. There was no physical
166
167
168
169
170
171

Id. at 465.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
Id. at 465–66.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 348.
According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, a contact microphone is “a microphone designed to be used in contact with the source of sound or with a resonating or conducting
surface.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/contact%20microphone.
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penetration inside of the booths.” 172 Technology, it seemed, had advanced
to the point that microphones outside a structure could capture the
sound of a person speaking inside the structure.
It was this last fact upon which the government leaned in its argument to the Supreme Court. Capturing the defendant’s side of the
conversation in the telephone booth did not violate the Fourth
173
And this approach made perAmendment, the government said.
fect sense at the time. In a ruling which had by then stood for almost
forty years, the Court in Olmstead had said that the crucial point was
whether or not a physical trespass had taken place. Since police had
installed the wiretap in Olmstead outside the home, with no physical
invasion, the wiretap without a warrant did not violate the Constitution. Naturally, the government reasoned that if they could capture a
conversation—that is, half a conversation—without invading a constitutionally protected area, its actions in Katz did not violate the Fourth
Amendment, and should therefore stand.
But in its Katz opinion, the Supreme Court decided that Olmstead
and the whole idea that a violation of the Fourth Amendment should
turn on an invasion of property rights had become outmoded.
Technology had made the rule dangerously obsolete: constitutional
protection against only physical violations of places seemed quaint,
when available devices could change the reality that one usually could
not hear into a telephone booth without standing close enough to be
seen. With new technology, police had no need to stand close, and
have the bad guy see them; instead, they could tape a contact microphone to the top of the booth and listen from a distance, gathering
valuable evidence undetected. This technological change forced the
Court to change course, and to change the Fourth Amendment’s focus. Going forward, the Court said, “the correct solution of Fourth
Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation of
the phrase ‘constitutionally protected area.’ . . . or the Fourth
174
Amendment protects people, not places.” Instead of looking to the
physical setting and whether the government had penetrated it, look
instead to what a person knowingly exposes to the public, versus what
175
he seeks to preserve as private. The place in which this happens—a
public telephone booth, a home office, or a public park—constitutes
a secondary consideration. In the words of Justice Harlan’s oft-

172
173
174
175

Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 131 (9th Cir. 1966) (emphasis added).
Id. at 352.
Id. at 350–51.
Id. at 351.
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quoted concurring opinion in Katz, “there is a twofold requirement,
first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” 176 Thus the Katz case, and its
exposure of how new but common technology that made previous
ways of thinking obsolete, became the occasion for overruling
Olmstead. Trespass upon property rights would no longer constitute
the measuring stick for whether an intrusion into Fourth Amendment territory had occurred; that way of looking at things was simply
no longer tenable.
We sit now at a similar point. The third-party doctrine may once
177
have made sense to the Court, as basing Fourth Amendment rights
on trespass law did in 1928. But widely available technology has progressed to the point that the assumptions underlying the third-party
doctrine simply do not fit the world. The contact microphone could
capture a conversation inside a closed structure, without penetrating
it, rendering the requirement for a violation of trespass law unnecessary. The advent of smart phones that can access data remotely,
which is the way that most data today is stored and accessed, renders
the third-party doctrine wildly out of step with the world. Unless
Americans can say without hesitation that all of their data should become available to the government upon a simple request to a thirdparty service provider, without the benefit of warrant issued by a
judge, things must change. Our moment today resembles what the
Supreme Court faced in Katz; the old regime must fall.
B. The Way Forward
What, then, should happen if Riley turns out to be the beginning
of the end of the for the third-party doctrine? This is a question any
critic of the existing structure must face. After all, law enforcement
makes wide use of its powers under the third-party doctrine now.
The question of what, if anything, should take its place looms large,
when we consider how police must face criminals and conduct investigations.

176
177

Id. at 361.
While the third-party doctrine may have made sense to the court at the time, as explained
above in notes 3–18, supra, I believe it was a mistaken approach and far too broad from
the very beginning.
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Various solutions, all of some complexity, have been proposed; all
178
take a critical view of the doctrine. They all seek an answer to the
real question: what protection should our communications with
third parties, so essential in today’s digital world, enjoy? But with just
179
one exception, they do not explain how our nation could arrive at
any new standards.
The history just reviewed above, from Olmstead to Katz, holds the
key. In the Katz era, with its technological advances in wiretapping
and other listening technologies, an old fashioned response
emerged: legislatures, not the Supreme Court, took the lead. In
180
1968, the U.S. Congress revised its antiquated wiretapping law and
181
passed the Federal Wiretap Act, also known as Title III. The revised
law directly addressed two major concerns at the time: “bugging,” the
use of secret recording technologies in a room or a space to intercept
“oral communications,” such as the telephone booth in Katz, and the
interception of private telephone communications (“wire communications”). The new law addressed these activities by both government
and private parties, and required the government to obtain court orders for this activity only if federal agents had probable cause and only if they could meet a number of further requirements. If permitted
by a court order, agents would still face a number of important regulations on how they could conduct these activities. State legislatures
182
Some of
also responded, passing wiretapping laws of their own.
178

179
180
181
182

See generally ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD
PARTY RECORDS (3d ed. 2013); CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW
GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 153– 54; 156–57; 171; 183– 84
(Univ. of Chicago Press, 2008); David Gray, The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Law Enforcement Access to Third Party Records: Critical Perspectives from a Technology-Centered Approach
to Quantitative Privacy, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 919 (2014); Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the
(Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of
Us, Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975 (2007); Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States:
How to Apply the Fourth Amendment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information form
Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373 (2006).
Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States, supra note 178, at 373–76.
The old law on wiretapping was part of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1934).
18 U.S.C. § 2510–2522 (1968).
Ala. Code § 13A-11-30(1); Alaska Stat. §§ 42.40.300(a) & 42.20.310(a)(1); Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 13-3005; Ark. Code Ann. § 5-60-120(a); Cal. Penal Code § 632(a); Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 18-9-303(1); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-570d(a); Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11, § 1335(a)(4);
D.C. Code. Ann. § 23-542(b)(3); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-11-62; Haw. Rev. Stat. §§80342(b)(3) & 711-1111(1)(d); 720 ILS 5/14-2”(a); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-33.5-1-5(2); Iowa
Code Ann. §§ 727.8 & 808B.2(2)(c); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-4001(a)(3) & 21-4002(a)(1);
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 526.010; Md. Code Section 10-402. Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article; Minn. Stat. Ann § 626A.D2 subd. 2(d); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-531(e); Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 542.402(2)(3)(Supp.); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-213; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 86-702(2)(c);
Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 200.620 & 48.077; N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:156A-4(d); N.M. Stat. Ann §30-12-
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these state laws were more stringent than the federal law, requiring
police to jump through additional hoops and limiting police conducting of surreptitious recording in ways that the federal law did
183
not.
The important point is that, with the third-party doctrine not just
accommodated to but wiped away, our legislatures would have the
opportunity—indeed, they would face the necessity—of having the
kind of conversation about privacy we so badly need. What digital
records of citizens should enjoy protection from government surveillance, absent probable cause? What kind and degree of such surveillance is appropriate when probable cause is present? Rather than
failing to protect our digital details simply because they are not secret
from everyone, our representatives would need to ask “when and how
should our digital lives be protected, and how should we protect that
in legislation?” Whether or not our digital information is secret from
all third parties is no longer a viable way to look at the question of
government surveillance, if it ever was. Rather, the question should
be what protection for our privacy we, as a society, wish to have.
CONCLUSION
The third-party doctrine, which allows the government to obtain
any information that a person sends to a third party without a warrant, has become an open door to government snooping. For more
than four decades, under this rule the government has been free to
get information sent to a third party by a citizen, even if the citizen
and the third party agree that the information will stay private and
will only be used for very limited purposes. In today’s world, with the

183

.

1(C)&(E); N.Y. Penal Law §250.00(1); N.C. Gen Stat. § 15A-287(a); N.D. Cent. Code
§12.1-15-02(3)(c); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2933.52(B)(4); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 13,
§176.4(5); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat Ann. § 5704(4); R.I. Gen. Laws §11-35-21(c)(3); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 23A-35A-20(1); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-601(b)(5); Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 16.02(b); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-9-401(2), 76-9-403(1)(a), & 77-23a-4(7)(b); Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. § 9.73.030(1)(a); W. Va. Code § 62-1D-3; Wis. Stat Ann. §§ 968.31(c)
&885.365(1); Wyo. Stat. § 7-3-602(b)(iv).
At least twelve states require more than the Federal Government to allow an interception
or a recording of a phone call, in terms of the most basic criterion. While the Federal
Government (and most states, for that matter) require only the consent of one party to
the conversation to allow interception or recording without a warrant, twelve states require that both parties to the conversation consent. Those states include California,
Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Washington. REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS, REPORTER’S RECORDING GUIDE: TAPE-RECORDING LAWS AT A GLANCE (2012),
https://www.rcfp.org/reporters-recording-guide/tape-recording-laws-glance.

932

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18:3

most personal kinds of information sent to third parties and accessed
from third parties untold millions of times every day, the third-party
doctrine has become a distinct danger to the privacy of everyone who
uses modern communication tools housed in the typical smart
phone.
Fortunately, whether intending to or not, the Supreme Court has
begun to move the law away from the third-party doctrine. The
Court’s opinion in Riley does not overrule the Miller or Smith cases,
but Riley forced the Justices to recognize reality: if the data in a smart
phone enjoyed Fourth Amendment protection, so too did data not in
the phone but accessed from a third party through the phone. There
is no practical difference between the two, and in a subsequent case,
the Court will find the pull to uproot the third-party doctrine too
much to resist. That day does not lie far in the future.

